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TRADE OPENNESS, CAPITAL MOBILITY, AND THE SACRIFICE RATIO
1. Introduction
The path-breaking work of Romer (1993) highlighted an apparent inverse
relationship in cross-country data between the degree of openness to international trade
and the inflation rate. Romer‘s suggested explanation for this relationship is that
increased trade openness exposes a nation to greater negative terms-of-trade effects
resulting from domestic output expansions, thereby reducing the incentive for a central
bank to engage in inflationary policymaking. Lane (1997) supplemented this rationale
by proposing that increased trade openness reduces the potential output gains from
unexpected inflation in non-traded-goods sectors characterized by imperfect
competition and sticky product prices. In addition, Karras (1999) argued that greater
indexation of nominal wages to unexpected inflation in response to increased trade
openness could also reduce the incentive for central banks to inflate.
Temple (2002), however, questioned the relevance of explanations relying on a
presumption that increased trade openness reduces the sacrifice ratio, because
analysis of cross-country data failed to reveal such a relationship. Indeed, Daniels,
Nourzad, and VanHoose (2005) have recently offered evidence indicating that once the
role of central bank independence is considered, increased trade openness is
associated with an increase in the sacrifice ratio, a result consistent with the analysis of
Rogoff (2006), enunciations of some policymakers, such as Bean (2006), and evidence
provided by Duca and VanHoose (2000) indicating that increases in product-market
competition from both domestic and international sources have contributed to a
shallower U.S. Phillips curve. This finding is obviously at odds with a standard BarroGordon (1983) interpretation, although Daniels and VanHoose (2006) have provided a
theoretical rationale for how increased trade openness could both raise the sacrifice
ratio and reduce equilibrium inflation when imperfectly competitive product markets are

included in an open-economy Barro-Gordon analysis. Furthermore, Bowdler (2004)
suggests that the nature of the trade openness-sacrifice ratio relationship may depend
on the exchange-rate regime that is in place.
Separately, an additional line of research has focused on the other key aspect of
globalization, capital mobility, and its relationship with both the sacrifice ratio and
inflation. Gruben and McLeod (2002, 2004) suggest that increased capital mobility may
act as a policy commitment mechanism that yields lower equilibrium inflation and
present evidence supporting a disinflationary role for higher capital mobility. At the
same time, however, work by Razin and Yuen (2002), Loungani, Razin, and Yuen
(2001), and Razin and Loungani (2005) has suggested a positive relationship between
capital mobility and the sacrifice ratio—again, a result inconsistent with a narrow BarroGordon-style interpretation. As a rationalization of how greater capital mobility could
simultaneously contribute to lower inflation while increasing the sacrifice ratio, Razin
and Loungani suggest that globalization may have boosted policymakers‘ loss weight
on inflation and thereby induced lower equilibrium inflation.
Clearly, there remains a wide array of views regarding the effects of globalization
on the sacrifice ratio and the relationship between these effects and the trade
openness-inflation and capital mobility-inflation relationship. Some have, for instance,
questioned whether the trade openness-inflation relationship either may be illusory, as
suggested by Terra (1998), or may have shifted or even broken down since the early
1990s, as argued by Bleaney (1999). Indeed, Ball (2006) questions whether there is
sufficient evidence to conclude, at least for the United States, that either trade openness
or capital mobility is related to either the sacrifice ratio or inflation.
In light of these conflicting views, further exploration of the effects of greater
trade openness and capital mobility is clearly warranted. In this paper, our objective is
to investigate the separate and combined effects of both potential manifestations of
globalization—increased trade openness and greater capital mobility—on the sacrifice
2

ratio. We develop a simple open-economy model that incorporates both openness to
trade and the mobility of capital, and we analyze its predictions regarding effects of both
forms of globalization on the sacrifice ratio. As emphasized with respect to trade
openness by Daniels and VanHoose (2006) and with regard to capital mobility by
Loungani, Razin, and Yuen (2001), the extent to which nominal rigidities are a prevalent
feature of a nation‘s economy has a critical bearing on how globalization affects the
sacrifice ratio. Thus, we utilize a model in which a portion of firms utilizes nominal wage
contracts and in which remaining firms do not.
Our consideration of wage contracts as a source of nominal rigidity differs from
the recent emphasis on price stickiness in much of the recent literature. In part, this
choice is based on evidence that nominal wage rigidities are an important factor in the
openness-inflation relationship (see Daniels, Nourzad, and VanHoose, 2006). More
generally, however, this choice reflects our fundamental agreement with Cukierman
(2004), who argues out that adding product-price stickiness to input-price stickiness
arising from nominal wage contracts ultimately adds little of fundamental importance to
the nature of analysis of trade-offs faced by policymakers.1 Indeed, consistent with
Cukierman‘s point, our model yields sacrifice-ratio implications for firms utilizing nominal
wage contracts that are analogous to those obtained by Razin and Yuen (2002),
Loungani, Razin and Yuen (2001), and Razin and Loungani (2005) in their sticky-pricebased analyses of the openness-sacrifice ratio relationship. Nevertheless, our inclusion
of firms that face no direct nominal wage rigidities—but which nonetheless confront
spillovers created by nominal wage rigidities at other firms in the economy, as in Duca
(1987) and Duca and VanHoose (2001)—allows for partial price adjustment that
generalizes our analysis of the effects of greater capital mobility and its interaction with
impacts of increased trade openness.
The next section presents our theoretical framework, and section 3 investigates
its implications for the relationships among trade openness, capital mobility, and the
3

sacrifice ratio. Section 4 explores the empirical evidence regarding these relationships.
Section 5 summarizes our conclusions.
2. A Simple Open-Economy Model
The theoretical model combines elements of the framework utilized by Benavie
(1983) and Daniels (1997) and the model developed in Daniels and VanHoose (2006).
There are numerous atomistic firms, indexed i, distributed uniformly along a unit
interval. In a portion, , of firms, nominal wages are set in advance of labor-market
clearing. In the portion of firms, 1-, that do not utilize such contracts, spot labor
markets determine nominal wages. In a closed-economy version of this type of model,
Duca and VanHoose (2001) have shown that if risk-neutral firms and risk-averse
workers face common aggregate shocks and diverse firm-specific disturbances, the
contract share of firms  typically lies between zero and unity but rises as the volatility
of aggregate shocks increases relative to the variability of firm-specific disturbances. To
focus on the issues at hand, we treat  as an exogenous parameter and thereby
abstract from considerations of shocks that can affect the share of firms with nominal
wage contracts.
The output produced by a given firm i is given by
(1)

yi = li ,

where yi is the log of output and li is the log of employment at firm i. The demand for the
output of a domestic firm in sector i as a share of aggregate domestic output is

(2)

yi - y = -(pi - p),
1

1

0

0

where y   y i di is the log of aggregate domestic output, p   pi di is the log of the
aggregate domestic price level, and  > 1 is the elasticity of demand for the output of
firms in sector i of the domestic country.
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The domestic nation‘s income-expenditure equilibrium condition (for a derivation
of this Cobb-Douglas approximation, see, for instance, Canzoneri and Henderson,
1991, or Bryson, et al., 1993) is given by
(3)

y =  (p* + s - p) + (1-  )y +  y* -  [r – ( p+e1 - p)];

where the average propensity to import,  , is a fraction;  is the elasticity of desired
spending with respect to the real exchange rate; p* is the log of the aggregate foreign
price level; s is the log of the domestic currency price of foreign currency; y* is the log of
aggregate foreign output;  is the semi-elasticity of domestic spending with respect to
the domestic real interest rate; r is the domestic nominal interest rate, and p+e1 is the
current expected value of the log of the price level in the next period.
Domestic money market equilibrium is given by
(4)

m – p = σy - γr – ξ(r* + s+e1 - s),

where m is the log of the money stock, r* is the foreign nominal interest rate, s is the log
of the nominal exchange rate measured in units of domestic currency per unit of foreign
currency, and s+e1 is the current expected value of the log of the exchange rate in the
following period. Including (4) would permit a thorough-going analysis of the
implications of this model for equilibrium inflation in a setting in which the nominal
money stock is an instrument of monetary policy. In a setting in which the instrument of
monetary policy is the interest rate, (4) would play a role in determining the resulting
endogenous quantity of money.
The balance-of-payments equilibrium condition is2
(5)

(1+ )(p* + s - p) -  y +  r -  (r* + s+e1 - s) +  y* = 0,
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where  ,  ,  , ψ, and φ are nonnegative structural parameters. Note that if  = ψ
and  =  , then domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes. If additionally the
limiting case holds in which    , then there is also complete capital mobility, and the
uncovered interest parity condition is satisfied; that is, r = r* + s+e1 - s. More generally, a
higher value of  indicates an increase in the degree of capital mobility irrespective of
the substitutability of domestic and foreign bonds, as long as  > 0 and ψ > 0.
Specifying analogous structural relationships for a foreign nation would yield a
two-country framework in which y*, p*, and r* would be endogenous variables, but here
we assume the output and prices abroad are exogenously determined. Henceforth, the
foreign money stock, foreign price level, and foreign output are normalized at unity, so
that p* and y* equal zero, and r* is assumed equal to ρ, a constant world interest rate.
Using (5), (3), (2), and (1) in the profit function, PiYi – WiLi , yields the labor
demand function for a firm i (with the intercept suppressed because it plays no role in
our subsequent analysis):
(6)

l id =

e
e
-  (wi - p ) -  p +  (1+  +  ) p+1
  (  + s+1
) - r
,
 ( +  -  )

where wi is the log of the nominal wage for the firm,   1+(1-  ) +  ,

   (1+  +  ) + , and    (1+ +  ) +  . Workers can consume domestic
and foreign goods, so labor supply to firms depends on the real wage computed in
terms of the overall price workers pay for a basket of both domestic and foreign goods:
(7)

lis = [wi – (1-β)p – βs],

where  > 0. Thus, for firms with or without nominal wage contracts, the full-information,
market-clearing wage satisfies (6) and (7) simultaneously and equals
^

(8)

wi =

[  (1-  ) (     ) + (  -  )] p +  (1+  +  ) p+1 +   (     )s +  (  + s+1 ) - Λ r
e

2

 [ (     ) +  ]
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e

.

Substitution of (8) into either (6) or (7) and the result into (1) yields output of a
noncontract firm with market-clearing (mc) wages:
 {[1-  (1-  )]  -  } p +  (1+  +  ) p+1 +   (     )s +  (  + s+1 ) -  Λ r
e

(9)

mc

yi =

2

e

 [ (     ) +  ]

Thus, the output of firms with market-determined nominal wages naturally depends on
the current price level, anticipated exchange rate, and interest rate and on the
anticipated future price level and exchange rate.
For the fraction, , of firms with nominal wage contracts, if the contract wage is
equal to the expected value of the market clearing wage, substituting the expectation of
(8) into (6) and the result in (1) yields output of a firm with wage contracts, given by
(  -  )[ +  ] p -  [  (1-  ) + (  -  )] p +  { +  [ - (1+  +  )]} p+1
e

c

yi =

  [ +  ]
2

{ [ +  ] -  }(  + s+1 ) - 
e

(10)

e

+

2

 s e -  Λ[ +  ]r -  Λr e

  [ (   -  ) +  ]
2

,

where   (   -  ) and where p e and s e are the expectations of the current price
level and exchange rate held by wage setters at the beginning of the current period
based on prior information. Of course, these latter expectations play key roles in
determining the contract nominal wage rate established at the outset of the period and
hence influence equilibrium employment and output levels of firms utilizing wage
contracts.
3. Relating Trade Openness and Capital Mobility to the Sacrifice Ratio
To explore the separate direct and interactive effects of trade openness and
capital mobility on the sacrifice ratio, we note first that since firms behave identically,
y ic = y c for all i  [0, ], and y imc = y mc for all i  (, 1]. It follows that y = (1-)ymc+

yc, so that responsiveness of aggregate output to a change in the domestic price level is
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.

given by

y mc
y c
y

= 1   
. Hence, the aggregate sacrifice ratio is the weighted
p
p
p

average of the sacrifice ratio applicable the sacrifice ratio applicable to the portion of
firms with spot-market-determined wages and the portion utilizing nominal wage
contracts.
From (9) and (10), the separate effects of an increase in the price level on output
for firms with and without nominal wage contracts are given by

(11)

 {[1-  (1-  )] -  }
y mc
=
,
p
 [ ( +  -  ) +  ]

which is more likely to be positive if  is significantly greater than unity, so that product
markets are highly competitive, and if  is relatively small, so that labor supply is
relatively inelastic, and
(12)

y c
 - 
,
=
p  ( +  -  )

which is also more likely to be positive if  is significantly greater than unity, so that
there is a relatively significant degree of competition in product markets.

 y mc 
 y c 
 p 
 p 


  0 . As in Daniels and
It is straightforward to show that
 0 and that 




VanHoose (2006), greater trade openness causes desired spending on domestic
products to be responsive to changes in domestic income, which in turn causes profitmaximizing prices of firms in both labor-market-clearing and wage-contracting sectors to
be less sensitive to a variation in aggregate domestic output. As a consequence, the
aggregate price level is less responsive to a change in aggregate output, implying
conversely that there is an increased sensitivity of output to a change in the price level.
Together, these results imply that an increase in the average propensity to import
8

makes desired expenditures on domestic output less sensitive to changes in domestic
income, so that each firm‘s profit-maximizing price is less responsive to a change in
aggregate domestic output. Thus, greater trade openness unambiguously boosts the
aggregate sacrifice ratio.
The effects of increased capital mobility in this model are less clear-cut. For
firms at which contracts set nominal wages in advance of product-market clearing,
 y c 
 p 

cumbersome computations verify that, for > 0, the sign of 
hinges in large part


on the interest-rate sensitivity of aggregate demand relative to the real-exchange-rate
responsiveness of domestic demand. This conclusion is analogous to that derived by
Loungani, Razin, and Yuen (2001) in the context of a combined flexible-price/stickyprice framework. As in their model, in the portion of the economy that is not directly
constrained by nominal rigidities, there is greater scope for interest-rate and realexchange-rate adjustments that in turn feed back to induce price and wage adjustments
at these firms. In contrast to the economy-wide sticky-price settings considered by
Razin and Yuen (2002) and Razin and Loungani (2005), which give rise to an
 y c 
 p 


unambiguously positive value for
, wage and price adjustments at firms with


market-determined wages spill over to influence prices at firms utilizing nominal wage
contracts. As a consequence, the relative sensitivities of aggregate demand to interestrate and real-exchange-rate variations are crucial determinants of the responsiveness of
output to the price level at firms with market-clearing wages. It can be shown that, in
accord with the conclusions of Loungani et al., greater capital mobility boosts the
 y mc 
 p 


sacrifice ratio—that is,
> 0—for parameter configurations and  that are


sufficiently large, so that there is a relatively high interest sensitivity of domestic and
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foreign asset demands and a relatively large interest responsiveness of desired
domestic expenditures, and in which  is sufficiently small, so that desired domestic
spending is relatively unresponsive to variations in the real exchange rate.
For the portion of the economy comprised of firms with market-determined
 y mc 
 p 

wages, the sign of 
is highly ambiguous. At firms with market-clearing wages,


adjustments of product prices and nominal wages are restrained only to the extent that
spillovers are created by the failure of wages to adjust at firms with nominal wage
contracts. Although interactions among the relative magnitudes of  , ,  , and 

determine the sign of

 y mc 
 p 




in this case as well, the interplay between fully adjusting

prices and wages—again, subject to spillovers from firms with nominal wage
contracts—yields complicated effects of prices on output that are difficult to disentangle.
The upshot of this analysis is that to the extent that our model yields a prediction
about how greater capital mobility is likely to influence the sacrifice ratio, this prediction
depends crucially on the labor supply elasticity, the interest-rate sensitivities of domestic
and foreign asset demands, and the interest-rate responsiveness of desired domestic
expenditures. Under certain parameter configurations we can obtain a definite
prediction that increased capital mobility is likely to generate a rise in the sacrifice ratio
in nations in which nominal rigidities are an important feature. In nations experiencing
nominal rigidities but contrary parameter configurations, however, the opposite effect
could emerge. In countries in which significant portions of firms charge marketdetermined product prices and pay market-determined wages, the model yields no
definite theoretical predictions regarding the effects of greater capital mobility on the
sacrifice ratio.
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The model does, however, yield more straightforward implications regarding the
effects that an increased degree of capital mobility has on the impact of trade openness
mc

2  y
 

p 
on the sacrifice ratio—that is, the sign of 
. For both firms with and without


nominal wage contracts, greater capital mobility enhances the positive effect of trade
openness on the sacrifice ratio if  and  are sufficiently large and  is sufficiently
small. Thus, a reinforcing effect of capital mobility on the sacrifice-ratio impact of trade
openness is also more likely if there is a relatively high interest sensitivity of domestic
and foreign asset demands and a relatively large interest responsiveness of desired
domestic spending.
Greater trade openness does nothing to clear up the theoretical ambiguities of
the effects of greater capital mobility on the sacrifice ratio. Consequently, the
theoretical model offers no clear-cut predictions regarding whether or not increased
trade openness may or may not reinforce the impact of greater capital mobility on the
sacrifice ratio.
4. Empirical Implications and Evidence
The forgoing discussion yields three empirical implications:
i)

taking into account the effect of central bank independence, increased trade
openness makes output more price-sensitive and consequently raises the
sacrifice ratio;

ii)

higher capital mobility generally has uncertain affects on the sacrifice ratio,
but in nations in which the use of nominal wage contracts is more
widespread, greater capital mobility is more likely to boost the sacrifice ratio if
domestic spending is relatively responsive to interest-rate changes but
relatively unresponsive to real-exchange-rate variations; and
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iii)

if domestic expenditures are relatively sensitive to interest-rate variations but
relatively insensitive to changes in real exchange rates, higher capital mobility
is likely to reinforce the positive effect of increased trade openness on the
sacrifice ratio.

Below, we do not attempt to measure relative responsiveness of aggregate spending to
interest-rate and exchange-rate variations across countries. We do, however, utilize
measures of trade openness, capital mobility, central bank independence, and wage
duration in an attempt to evaluate the independent and interactive effects of these
variables on the sacrifice ratio in cross-country data.
4.1 Data
We employ the data made available by Temple (2002) and Daniels et al. (2005),
taken from Ball (1994), to test our hypotheses regarding the sacrifice ratio. This data
set includes estimates of the sacrifice ratio (SAC) for 58 disinflationary periods occurring
in 16 moderate inflation OECD economies from 1960 through the 1980s, initial inflation
preceding the disinflationary episode, the change in inflation during the disinflationary
period (InflationΔ), the length of the deflationary period (Length), and a measure of
wage contract duration (Wdur). We augment this data with several other variables.
First, we add the degree of central bank independence (CBI), taken from Franzese
(2002), which is a weighted average of legal independence, a characterization of
independence based on answers to a survey completed by individuals at central banks
(Cukierman, 1992), economic independence, political independence (Grilli, et al., 1991),
and Bade and Parkin‘s (1982) index of central bank independence. Next we add a
measure of trade openness (Trade) which is the average of the sum of imports and
exports as a percentage of GDP over the sample period, and a measure of capital
mobility (Capital) which is the average of the sum of total capital inflows and outflows as
a percentage of GDP. Data on trade flows and capital flows are taken from the
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International Monetary Fund‘s International Financial Statistics. Table 1 contains
descriptive statistics on the sample data.
4.2 Trade Openness and the Sacrifice Ratio
Daniels et al. (2005) examine the impact of trade openness on the sacrifice ratio
using the average of imports as a percentage of GDP. They show the importance of
accounting for the interaction of CBI and openness and suggest testing for outliers in
the data. We employ the same measures for the sacrifice ratio, but we measure trade
openness as the average of the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP.
Following Daniels et al., we test for outliers using the DFITS test, Cook‘s distance test,
and Welsch‘s distance test, and our results similarly identify Germany‘s 1973-1978
disinflation episode as an outlier. We drop this single observation from all of our
regression models.
The results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 reaffirm Daniels et al.‘s conclusion that
the coefficient of trade openness is insignificant (column 1) unless its interaction with
central bank independence is included. Column 2 includes this interaction, with the
results that the coefficient on trade openness is positive and statistically significant,
while the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant. Hence, we reattain the Daniels et al. result that trade openness and the sacrifice ratio are positively
related and greater CBI reduces the effect of trade openness on the sacrifice ratio.
4.2 Trade Openness, Capital Mobility,, and the Sacrifice Ratio
Aizenman and Noy (2004) examine the correlation among financial and trade
openness, measured as the sum of capital inflows and outflows as a percentage of
GDP and as the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP, respectively.
They show that there is a linear two-way feedback relationship among the two
openness variables. This simultaneous correlation between the two openness variables
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is, of course, problematic in our empirical study making it difficult if not impossible to
isolate the individual effects of trade openness and capital mobility.3 This problem is
compounded by the fact that some of our variables, CBI and wage duration in particular,
have limited variability within our data set. One method of dealing with this problem
would be to expand the sample, not only increasing our degrees of freedom but also the
variation of key variables. However, combining estimates of the sacrifice ratio, central
bank independence and (especially) wage duration is problematic and limits our ability
to expand the data, resulting in less than 60 usable observations. Hence, to examine
the relationship between capital mobility and the sacrifice ratio, we reduce colinearity
among the variables by dropping the interaction term between trade openness and
central bank independence in the remaining columns of Table 2 and in Columns 3, 4,
and 5 of Table 2 we replace trade openness with capital mobility as the single measure
of international openness. Furthermore, we examine the interaction of capital mobility
with CBI and wage duration separately.4 In column 3, the effect of capital mobility on
the sacrifice ratio is positive but statistically insignificant. In column 4, we find that
accounting for an interaction between capital mobility and central bank independence
leads to the implication of a positive (statistically significant at the 10 percent level)
effect of greater capital mobility on the sacrifice ratio. As with the trade openness
measure of international openness, however, the impact of capital mobility on the
sacrifice ratio is significantly reduced by increased central bank independence.
In comparing columns 3 and 4 to columns 1 and 2, it is tempting to conclude that
in light of the relatively high bilateral correlation between trade openness and capital
mobility, the empirical results suggest that both international openness measures are
essentially substitutable. Recall, however, that the theoretical model suggests a
positive interaction between the degree of wage stickiness and the sacrifice-ratio effect
of greater capital mobility. Column 5 includes an interaction between our measures of
these two variables. Doing so results in a statistically insignificant estimated effect of
14

capital mobility on the sacrifice ratio but a positive (statistically significant at the 10
percent level) interactive effect of wage duration and capital mobility. Thus, consistent
with the theory, the degree of wage stickiness plays a key role in conditioning capital
mobility‘s sacrifice-ratio impact.
The relatively high correlation between our trade openness and capital mobility
measures suggests that including both as independent variables is a problematic
exercise. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness in examining the implications
forthcoming from the data, in columns 6, 7, and 8 of Table 2 we include both
international openness measures. The coefficient estimate for capital mobility is
positive but statistically insignificant in column 6. When the interaction between capital
mobility and wage duration is added in column 7, the direct effect of capital mobility on
the sacrifice ratio remains statistically insignificant (p-value of 20 percent, two-tailed
test). Consistent with theory, however, the effect of an interaction between capital
mobility and wage duration is positive and significant, indicating that a greater degree of
wage rigidity tends to bring about a positive effect of increased capital mobility on the
sacrifice ratio. Nevertheless, in both of the models for which results are displayed in
columns 6 and 7, tests of a joint significance of trade and capital mobility effects on the
sacrifice ratio are insignificant.
Column 8 reports the results of adding an interaction term between trade
openness and capital mobility. Neither the openness measures nor the interaction term
are significant, nor are they jointly significant. Thus, the empirical results do not resolve
the theoretical prediction indicating that greater capital mobility potentially could
reinforce the sacrifice-ratio impact of increased trade openness.
What can we conclude from these results? First, consistent with earlier work by
Daniels et al. (2005) and with the model developed in this paper, increased openness to
international trade has a positive effect on the sacrifice ratio once the dampening effect
of greater central bank independence (CBI) is taken into account. Second, consistent
15

with evidence offered by Razin and Loungani (2005), accounting for the conditioning
effects of CBI implies that greater capital mobility also boosts the sacrifice ratio. Third,
the finding that greater wage stickiness boosts the positive effect of greater capital
mobility on the sacrifice ratio is consistent with the prediction of our theoretical model
when aggregate spending is more sensitive to interest-rate variations than to exchangerate variations. This finding highlights the importance of considering potential effects
specific to increased capital mobility rather that considering the impact of ―globalization‖
to be captured by trade openness alone. Fourth, the theoretical model suggests that
increased openness to trade and greater capital mobility may have self-reinforcing
positive effects on the sacrifice ratio, although the positive correlation between the two
globalization measures complicates interpreting regression results in which both
measures are taken to be independent variables. When we treat both measures of
international openness as independent variables, we obtain a positive coefficient
estimate on the interactive effect that the two have on the sacrifice ratio, but this
estimate is statistically insignificant.
Taken together, the first three conclusions provide support for concluding from
cross-country data that increased trade openness and greater capital mobility do indeed
independently tend to boost the sacrifice ratio. Thus, our analysis supports the
conclusion that globalization, whether through more openness to trade or greater
openness to capital flows, contributes to a shallower Phillips curve. Although our
theoretical framework indicates that there is also a potential for interactive effects of the
two globalization measures on the sacrifice ratio, we do not find evidence of statistically
significant interacting impacts of increased trade openness and greater capital mobility.
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5. Conclusion
This paper has developed and empirically evaluated implications of an openeconomy framework exploring the separate impacts of, and interactions among trade
openness and capital mobility as factors affecting the sacrifice ratio. Consistent with
our theoretical model, we find evidence in cross-country data of separate effects of
increased trade openness and greater capital mobility influence the sacrifice ratio.
Once the conditioning effect of central bank independence is taken into account, we find
that increases in both measures of international openness result in a higher sacrifice
ratio. We also find evidence that greater wage duration enhances the positive sacrificeratio effect of more mobile capital, which is consistent with our theory‘s implication that
the impact of greater capital mobility is positively related to the degree of wage
stickiness in a nation‘s economy. Although our model suggests the potential for greater
capital mobility to enhance the sacrifice-ratio impact of increased trade openness, the
empirical results do not necessarily provide support for this prediction.
Overall, our analysis of cross-country data supports the conclusion that the
forces of globalization—whether manifested as from increased openness to
international trade or greater mobility of capital—tend to raise the sacrifice ratio. In our
view, future work examining the impact of globalization on the sacrifice ratio should
focus on country-specific data [see, for instance, early work along these lines in Ball
(2006) and Sbordone (2007)]. It remains to be seen to what extent increased trade
openness and greater capital mobility affect the inflation sensitivity of output and the
slope of the Phillips curve within individual nations.

17

REFERENCES
Aizenman, Jashua, and Ilan Noy. 2004. On the two way feedback between financial and
trade openness, NBER Working Paper 10496.
Bade, Robin, and Michael Parkin. 1982. Central bank laws and monetary policy.
Unpublished Manuscript, University of Western Ontario.
Ball, Laurence. 2006. Has globalization changed inflation? NBER Working Paper
12687, November.
Ball, Laurence. 1994. What determines the sacrifice ratio? In Monetary Policy, ed.
N.Gregory Mankiw. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL, pp. 155-193.
Barro, Robert, and David Gordon. 1983. A positive theory of monetary policy in a
natural rate model. Journal of Political Economy 91, 589-610.
Bean, Charles. 2006. Globalization and inflation. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin,
Fourth Quarter, 468-475.
Bleaney, Michael. 1999. The disappearing openness-inflation relationship: A crosscountry analysis of inflation rates. Working Paper WP/99/161, International
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Benavie, Arthur. 1983. Achieving external and internal targets with exchange-rate and
interest-rate intervention. Journal of International Money and Finance 2, 75-85.
Bowdler, Christopher. 2004. Openness, exchange rate regimes, and the Phillips curve.
Manuscript, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
Bryson, Jay, Henrik Jensen, and David VanHoose. 1993. Rules, discretion, and
international monetary and fiscal policy coordination. Open Economies Review 4
(2), 117-132.
Canzoneri, Matthew, and Dale Henderson. 1991. Monetary Policy in Interdependent
Economies: A Game Theoretic Approach. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Cukierman, Alex. 2004. Monetary institutions, monetary union, and unionized labor
markets: Some recent developments. In Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policies, and

18

Labor Markets: Macroeconomic Policymaking in the EMU, ed. Roel Beetsma,
Carlo Favero, Alessandro Missale, Anton Muscatelli, Fiergiovanna Natale, and
Patrizio Tirelli. Cambridge University Press, Cambride, UK, pp. 299-326.
Cukierman, Alex. 1992. Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence: Theory
and Evidence. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Daniels, Joseph. 1997. Optimal sterilization policies in interdependent economies.
Journal of Economics and Business 49, 43-60.
Daniels, Joseph, and David VanHoose. 2006. Openness, the sacrifice ratio, and
inflation: Is there a puzzle? Journal of International Money and Finance 25,
1336-1347.
Daniels, Joseph, Farrokh Nourzad, and David VanHoose. 2006. Openness,
centralized wage bargaining, and inflation. European Journal of Political
Economy 22, 969-988.
Daniels, Joseph, Farrokh Nourzad, and David VanHoose. 2005. Openness, central
bank independence, and the sacrifice ratio. Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking 37, 371-379.
Duca, John. 1987. The spillover effects of nominal wage rigidity in a multisector
economy. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 19, 117-121.
Duca, John, and David VanHoose. 2001. The rise of goods-market competition and
the fall of wage contracting: Endogenous wage contracting in a multisector
economy. Journal of Macroeconomics 23 (1), 1-29.
Duca, John, and David VanHoose. 2000. Has greater competition restrained inflation?
Southern Economic Journal 66, 479-491.
Franzese, Robert, Jr., 2002, Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

19

Grilli, Vittorio, Donato Masciandaro, and Guido Tabellini. 1991. Political and monetary
institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries. Economic
Policy 13, 341-392.
Gruben, William, and Darryl McLeod. 2004. Capital market liberalization, disinflation,
and commitment. Manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and Fordham
University.
Gruben, William, and Darryl McLeod. 2002. Capital account liberalization and inflation.
Economics Letters 77, 221-225.
Karras, George. 1999. Openness and the effects of monetary policy. Journal of
International Money and Finance 18, 13-26.
Lane, Philip. 1997. Inflation in open economies. Journal of International Economics
42, 327-347.
Loungani, Prakas, Assaf Razin, and Chi-Wa Yuen. 2001. Capital mobility and the
output-inflation trade-off. Journal of Development Economics 64, 255-274.
Razin, Assaf, and Prakash Loungani, 2005, Globalization and equilibrium outputinflation trade-offs. NBER Working Paper 11641, September.
Razin, Assaf, and Chi-Wa Yuen. 2002. The ‗new Keynesian‘ Phillips curve: Closed
economy versus open economy. Economics Letters 75, 1-9.
Rogoff, Kenneth. 2006. Impact of globalization on monetary policy. Symposium on the
New Economic Geography: Effects and Policy Implications. Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming,
http://www.kc.frb.org/PUBLICAT/SYMPOS/2006/sym06prg.htm.
Romer, David. 1993. Openness and inflation: Theory and evidence. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 108, 869-903.
Sbordone, Argia. 2007. Globalization and inflation dynamics: The impact of increased
competition. NBER Working Paper 13556, October 2007.

20

Temple, Jonathan. 2002. Openness, inflation, and the Phillips curve: a puzzle.
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 34, 450-468.
Terra, Cristina. 1998. Openness and inflation: A new assessment. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 113, 641-648.

21

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Cross-Section of 16 Countries*
Mean
Median
St. Dev.

SAC
CBI Inflation InflationΔ Length Wdur
0.716 0.496
8.134
4.604
2.719 1.404
0.578 0.449
7.800
3.740
2.000 2.000
0.928 0.194
3.983
2.820
1.386 0.776

Trade
0.899
0.862
0.414

Capital
0.084
0.063
0.053

* Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United
States
Glossary
SAC ≡ Sacrifice Ratio1
CBI ≡ Central Bank Independence, index of central bank independence2
Inflation ≡ Change in GDP deflator1
InflationΔ ≡ Drop in the rate of inflation during the given period 1
Length ≡ Length of disinflationary period in years1
Wdur ≡ wage contract duration1
Trade ≡ ratio of the sum of imports and exports to nominal GDP3
Capital ≡ sum of capital inflows and capital outflows to nominal GDP3
1
Temple (2002), Daniels et al. (2005), 2 Franzese (2002), 3 Calculated from the
International Financial Statistics
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Table 2
Sacrifice Ratio Estimates, Cross-Section of 16 Countriesa
(Absolute Values of t-Ratios Based on Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses.)

Constant
CBI
Trade

(1)
-0.389
0.54
1.284**
1.93
0.076
0.27

(2)
-2.900**
2.38
6.559***
2.97
3.025***
2.73

Capital
Inflation
InflationΔ
Length
Wdur

0.072*
1.66
-0.123***
2.21
0.290***
2.92
-0.292*
1.74

Trade*CBI

0.057
1.40
-0.095**
1.72
0.249**
2.52
-0.235
1.46
-6.089**
2.52

(3)
-0.424
0.61
1.287**
1.91

(4)
-1.234
1.61
3.750**
2.61

(5)
0.412
0.49
1.696**
2.54

1.035
0.57
0.076*
1.73
-0.128***
2.39
0.293***
3.02
-0.289
1.66

16.632**
2.06
0.066
1.43
-0.103
1.43
0.226**
2.14
-0.420**
2.42

-10.662
1.44
0.066
1.41
-0.106
1.65
0.231**
2.22
-0.815**
2.47

(6)
-0.406
0.56
1.291*
1.90
-0.086
0.17
1.553
0.47
0.076*
1.74
-0.131**
2.21
0.295***
2.95
-0.280
1.63

6.731*
1.74

Capital*Wdur

(7)
0.430
0.50
1.701**
2.52
-0.089*
0.18
-10.131
1.28
0.067
1.41
-0.109
1.58
0.233**
2.18
-0.806**
2.43

6.733*
1.73

-32.958*
1.83

Capital*CBI
Trade*Capital
Adjusted R2
F Statistic
Observations
a

(8)
-0.111
0.12
1.370**
1.97
-0.275
0.45
-2.820
0.31
0.076*
1.69
-0.125**
2.08
0.274**
2.61
-0.288*
1.67

0.286
4.83
57

0.382
6.11
57

0.288
4.89
57

0.348
5.03
57

0.345
4.91
57

0.289
4.14
57

0.345
4.23
57

2.636
0.56
0.294
3.56
57

All models omit Germany, 1973-1978, as a single outlier. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.

FOOTNOTES
1

There can be crucial differences between the ultimate policy implications of sticky-price
versus sticky-wage models, however, because in the former models a portion of firms
in the economy hold prices fixed, typically in light of menu costs, even after monetary
policymakers have engaged in policy actions, whereas in the latter models monetary
policy actions take place before prices are set, and firms optimally choose not to adjust
prices fully in light of wage rigidities.

2

The derivation of this condition mirrors Benavie (1983). From (3) the net trade balance
is  (p* + s - p) -  y +  y*. If the flow demand for domestic bonds is given by bd =  y*
+  r –  (r* + s+e1 - s) + p* + s, and if the flow demand for foreign bonds is given by bf
=  y -  r +  (r* + s+e1 - s) + p, then the net domestic capital inflow is defined as bd –
bf =(p* + s - p) -  y +  r -  (r* + s+e1 - s) +  y*, where      and      .
Adding the expression for the trade balance to the net capital inflow yields (5).

3

Aizenman and Noy estimate an 87 percent linear feedback between trade openness
and financial openness. The simple bilateral correlation between trade openness and
capital mobility in our data is 79 percent.

4

One way to deal with the colinearity in our model is to test the joint significance of the
related variables. We do so in a model that includes trade and capital as well as their
interaction with CBI. In this model, trade and capital are jointly significant with a pvalue of 3 percent. We also combine models (4) and (5) in Table 2 and test the joint
significance of capital, capital*Wdur, and capital*CBI. The p-value of the test of joint
significance (two-tailed test) is 17 percent.

